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September 12, 2005

John R. Nolon and Jessica A. Bacher
[John Nolon is a Professor at Pace University School of Law, the Director of its
Joint Center for Land Use Studies, and Visiting Professor at Yale’s School of
Forestry and Environmental Studies. Jessica Bacher is an Adjunct Professor at
Pace University School of Law and a Staff Attorney for the Land Use Law
Center.]
Abstract: Through a review of recent case history, this article examines the role
of courts in land use decisions. The consensus of the holdings is that a court
should not substitute it’s discretion for that of a local land use board so long as
the board’s decision was based on substantial evidence on the record. The
rational for this standard of deference is based on the idea that local land use
boards are legislative bodies that understand the needs of the communities they
serve. This article highlights several instances where appeals courts reign in the
power of trial courts that overstepped judicial bounds by annulling valid land use
board decisions.
***
During the 2004-2005 Term, the New York Court of Appeals handed down
decisions covering a broad range of issues in land use and property law. Evident
in the court’s decisions this term is the maturity of New York case law. Many of
its major holdings correct the decisions of lower courts that misapplied or
misunderstood previously-settled principles. The Court of Appeals continued this
year to struggle with the U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings in the regulatory takings
field. Subsequent to this term’s takings decision (Smith v. Mendon), the U.S.
Supreme Court clarified this area of law in Lingle v. Chevron. Future Court of
Appeals cases will follow the Court’s simplified tests for takings; this will modify
the rationale, rather than the results, of New York cases on the subject.
Regulatory Takings
In Smith v. Town of Mendon, 1 the Court of Appeals held that a
conservation restriction imposed as a condition to site plan approval is not an
exaction and is not subject to heightened judicial scrutiny under the Nollan/Dolan
tests when challenged as a regulatory taking. The Mendon Planning Board
conditioned its approval of the Smiths’ single family home proposal on the filing
of conservation restriction covering portions of the parcel located within the
town’s environmental protection overlay districts. The court declined “to extend
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the concept of exaction where there is no dedication of property to public use and
the restriction merely places conditions on development.” 2 The court instead
reviewed the case using the Supreme Court’s Agins test and found that the
conservation restriction did not constitute a taking because it did not deny the
Smiths all economically viable use of their property and “the conservation
restriction substantially advances a legitimate government purpose –
environmental preservation.”3
On May 23, 2005, in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 4 the Supreme Court
“correct[ed] course” in a unanimous decision holding that the Agins “substantially
advances” formula is not an appropriate test for determining whether a regulation
constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment. The “formula prescribes an
inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test, and . . . it has no proper
place in . . . takings jurisprudence.” 5 The effect of the Court’s holding and its
explanatory dicta is to clarify greatly the field of regulatory takings law as applied
to land use regulations and agency determinations.
The Court in Lingle identifies four categories of regulatory takings cases.
The first two categories are per se takings: void on their face without regard to
the extent of their impact on aggrieved property owners.
“First, where
government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her
property – however minor – it must provide just compensation.” 6 “A second
categorical rule applies to regulations that completely deprive an owner of ‘all
economically beneficial use’ of her property.” 7 The third category, land use
exactions, involves the imposition by a land use approval board of a condition
requiring a landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access to her
property – the effect of which is to oust the landowner from a portion of her
domain. 8
All other regulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set
forth in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City.” 9 The Penn Central
“principal guidelines” are: the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,
particularly the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental
regulation. “[T]he Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively,
upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it
interferes with legitimate property interests.” 10
Under current takings
jurisprudence, the Court of Appeals in Smith would have analyzed the
conservation restriction using the Penn Central test and not the Agins test.
Confirming Existing Jurisprudence
Zoning and Planning
In the Matter of Crown Communication New York, Inc. v. Department of
Transportation of the State of New York, City of New Rochelle et al., 11 the Court
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of Appeals held that the commercial telecommunication providers are exempt
from local zoning with regard to the installation of private antennae on state
owned telecommunication towers. In 1997, Castle Tower Holding Corporation
(later assigned to Crown Communication New York, Inc.) and the New York
State Police, on behalf of participating State agencies, entered into an agreement
providing Castle with an exclusive license to build and operate
telecommunications towers on state-owned lands and rights-of-way. The
agreement also allowed for the licensing of space on the towers to localities and
commercial wireless providers. Crown identified two sites for towers in the City
of New Rochelle along the Hutchinson River Parkway and licensed space on the
towers to several private telecommunications companies. Crown constructed
one of the towers and then began construction on the second tower at which time
the City issued a stop work order, claiming that a special permit from the City
was necessary for the construction of the towers in compliance with local zoning.
In 2001, Crown commenced an action to prohibit the City from enforcing
its zoning and to declare that the towers were immune from local regulation. The
Court of Appeals held that Crown and the private wireless telecommunications
providers were exempt from the local zoning laws. “[T]elecommunication
companies ‘are not precluded from enjoying the State’s immunity simply because
they are private entities or because co-locating on the DOT’s towers will advance
their financial interest.’” 12 “[I]t is not the private status of the Wireless Telephone
Providers but, rather, the public nature of the activity sought to be regulated by
the local zoning authority that is determinative in this case.”13
The court applied the County of Monroe “balancing of public interests” test
and weighed “the nature and scope of the instrumentality seeking immunity, the
kind of function or land use involved, the extent of the public interest to be served
thereby, the effect local land use regulation would have upon the enterprise
concerned and the impact upon legitimate local interest.” 14 The court held that
the State provided evidence that the towers would afford numerous benefits to
the public, including the development of a Statewide Wireless Network and the
Intelligent Transportation System that collects information on traffic flow, weather,
and road conditions. The court held that “the installation of licensed commercial
antennae on the towers should also be accorded immunity because co-location
serves a number of significant public interests that are advanced by the State’s
overall telecommunications plan.” 15 The fact that the private wireless providers
will profit from use of the towers does not undermine the public interest served. 16
“[T]he public and private uses of the towers are sufficiently intertwined to justify
exemption of the wireless providers from local zoning regulations.” 17
In Town of Concord v. Duwe, 18 the Court of Appeals upheld Duwe’s
convictions for violating the local recycling ordinance and zoning ordinance
resulting from the operation of a commercial mulching operation using tree bark
on his property. The court held that the local ordinances were not preempted by
or inconsistent with the state Solid Waste Management Act. “[L]ocal laws
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governing municipal solid waste management broader than—but consistent
with—the state legislation are explicitly permitted by the Environmental
Conservation Law.” 19 In 1980, in Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Caledonia, the court held the solid waste disposal provisions in the
Environmental Conservation Law did not preempt the field of waste
management. When the legislature enacted the Solid Waste Management Act in
1988 it could have chosen to preempt the field in light of Monroe-Livingston, but
did not. The court concluded that the legislature did not intend to preempt the
field and local governments are free to enact and enforce ordinances to deal with
local waste. In addition, the local ordinance’s definition of solid waste was not
inconsistent with the Solid Waste Management Act.
As it has several times in recent terms, the Court of Appeals had to restrain
lower courts from substituting their judgments for those of local land use boards.
In Metro Enviro Transfer v. Village of Croton-On-Hudson, 20 the Court of Appeals
reiterated the role of the courts in reviewing discretionary land use decisions. 21
The court upheld the village board of trustees’ denial of Metro Enviro Transfer’s
application for renewal of its special use permit to operate a waste transfer facility
in the village. The original permit gave the village the right to revoke it if any of
its conditions or limitations were violated. On numerous occasions Metro
intentionally violated the conditions in the permit and the board refused to reissue
the permit as a result. Metro Enviro Transfer argued and the supreme court
agreed that because there was no actual harm to the community or the
environment, the board’s denial of the permit renewal was arbitrary and
capricious and not supported by substantial evidence. During the three-year
special permit, Metro exceeded the capacity limitations on 26 occasions and
falsified records to hide the excesses. The facility accepted prohibited waste at
least 42 times, did not adequately train its personnel, kept insufficient records,
and inappropriately stored tires on the site. Metro admitted to these violations
and paid fines for many of the violations.
Following extensive hearings, the board denied Metro’s application to
renew its permit. In support of its decision, the board released a 15-page
statement of findings which included a chart summarizing the violations. In the
statement, the board relies significantly on the opinion of the town consultant who
stated that Metro continually violates regulations that are designed to protect
health and the environment despite its promises to improve.
The Court of Appeals concluded that “[a]lthough inconsequential violations
would not justify non-renewal, the many violations here, and their willful nature,
sufficiently support the [b]oard’s decision.”22 The board’s decision whether to
grant or renew a special permit is discretionary and will be upheld as long as it
has a proper basis and is not based solely on generalizations. “‘[E]xpert opinion .
. . may not be disregarded in favor of generalized community objections,’” 23 but
as long as there are other grounds in the record for the decision it will be upheld.
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The court held that substantial evidence of actual harm was not necessary
and the threat of harm from the repeated willful violations was sufficient grounds
to deny the renewal.
“There may, of course, be instances in which an applicant’s violation is so
trifling or de minimis that denying renewal would be arbitrary and capricious.” 24
Here, the board reviewed a substantial amount of evidence, it heard
contradictory evidence from Metro’s expert and its own, considered the evidence
and concluded that it could not continue to rely on Metro’s assurances of
compliance. “A reviewing court ‘may not substitute its own judgment for that of
the board, even if such a contrary determination is itself supported by the
record.’” 25 According to the court, even without the expert testimony, there was
sufficient evidence to sustain the board’s denial of Metro’s renewal application.
Real Property Tax
In Malta Town Centre I, Ltd. v. Town of Malta Board of Assessment
Review, 26 the Court of Appeals held that a reassessment under Real Property
Tax Law (RPTL) § 1573 can constitute an exception under the RPTL § 727
three-year respite from any change in the assessed valuation of property. In
2001, the Town and Town Centre entered into a stipulation that reduced the
assessed value of the Town Centre’s property to $7,800,000 for the 1998,1999,
2000, and 2001 tax years. The stipulation stated that the property would be
subject to RPTL § 727 which provides for a three-respite from any change in the
assessed valuation of the property. An exception to the three-year grace period
is when “a revaluation or update of all real property on the assessment roll” is
conducted. In 2002, a RPTL § 1573 reassessment was done by the town
resulting in an increased assessed valuation for the Town Centre’s property to
$9,750,000. RPTL § 1573 gives aid to municipalities that “annually conduct a
systematic analysis of all locally assessed properties using a methodology
specified in . . . regulations [promulgated by the state board; and] annually
revising assessments as necessary to maintain the stated uniform percentage
value.” 27 The Court of Appeals concluded that the RPTL § 1573 reassessment is
evidence of “a revaluation or update of all real property on the assessment role” 28
satisfying the exception to the RPTL § 727 three-year reprieve from changed
assessments.
In New York Telephone Company v. Supervisor of the Town of Oyster
Bay, the Court of Appeals held that “RPTL 102(14) does not authorize the town
to impose a special ad valorem levy for garbage collection on NYTC’s mass
properties because they do not and cannot receive any direct benefit from the
municipal service.” 29
NYTC owns telephone lines, poles, and other related
equipment on private and public land throughout the town. It does not own any
of the land where the equipment is located. The town imposed on NYTC an ad
valorum levy fee for garbage collection. NYTC challenged the levy because it
does not benefit from the garbage collection service as stated in the RPTL §
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102(14) definition of ad valorem. A property is benefited if it is capable of
receiving the services funded. The inquiry is based on the “innate features and
legally permissible uses of the property, not the particularities of its owners or
occupants or the state of the property at a fixed point in time.” 30 NYTC’s
equipment is incapable of producing refuse and therefore cannot benefit from
garbage collection. The court concluded that the ad valorem levies were invalid
and NYTC was entitled to reimbursement for previous payments.
In the Word of Life Ministries v. Nassau County, 31 the Court of Appeals
held that the Word of Life Ministries properties that are used as residences for
pastors are exempt from real property tax under RPTL § 462. Section 462
“states that ‘property owned by a religious corporation while actually used by the
officiating clergymen thereof for residential purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.’” The court declined to adopt a restrictive definition of “officiating,”
holding that the determination is based on the “cleric’s relationship with his or her
congregation, and not the hierarchal structure of the various clergy positions.”32
The pastors who live at the properties in question all are ordained and take part
in church services and share in the preaching and thus are “officiating clergy”
entitling the ministry to exemption under § 462.
State Environmental Quality Review Act
In City Council of the City of Watervliet v. Town of Colonie, 33 the Court of
Appeals held that “SEQRA requirements apply to all annexations under article
17 of the General Municipal Law, but that the extent of environmental
assessment that must be undertaken is dependent on the specific development
plans associated with the transfer of territory.” 34 Municipal Annexation Law,
article 17 of the General Municipal Law, outlines the procedures required to
effectuate an annexation of land from one municipality to another. In the present
case, East-West Realty Corporation sought to have 43 acres annexed from the
Town of Colonie to the adjacent City of Watervliet. The Colonie zoning law
permits single-family residences and East-West intended to build assisted living
senior apartments. The Municipal Annexation Law requires a finding by both
municipalities that the annexation is in the “over-all public interest.” Watervliet
determined that it was, but Colonie decided that an environmental review under
SEQRA is necessary to determine if the annexation is in the public interest. At
issue is whether SEQRA applies to municipal annexations even though the
Municipal Annexation Law provides detailed procedures for annexation and does
not explicitly incorporate SEQRA. The court held that “SEQRA promotes, rather
than undermines, the public interest purposes of article 17 of the General
Municipal Law and therefore . . . General Municipal Law § 718 (5) does not
exempt the annexation process from SEQRA review.” 35
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